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PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
ALL QUIET ON THE EMPLOYMENT FRONT: MANDATORY
ARBITRATION UNDER THE USERRA

Bradford J. Kelley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the
subsequent protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has
2
relied to an extraordinary level on its U.S. Reserve' and National Guard
3
members to support its overseas battlefield operations. The significant
increase in combat deployments, both in numbers and in length, has
4
taken a heavy toll on both the Reservist employee and the employer.
Modem trends indicate that reliance on Reservist forces is likely to
continue due to cost effectiveness and fundamental changes in military

*Bradford J. Kelley is an attorney with a law firm in Washington, D.C. Previously he was a judicial
law clerk for a federal district judge. Before law school, he served as a United States Army infantry
and intelligence officer and he is a veteran of the Iraq War. This Article is dedicated to the
American combat veterans of the Vietnam War.
1. Kevin D. Hartzell, Voluntary Warriors: Reserve Force Mobilization in the United States
and Canada, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 537, 537-38 (1996) ("There are seven individual components
in the reserve force structure of the U.S. Armed Forces: Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy
Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard.
Reserve personnel are divided into three categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired
Reserve.")
2. Id. at 538-39 ("Members of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are
drawn only from the Ready Reserve . .. ."); see, e.g., The Evolving Role of the Citizen Soldier,
NAT'L GUARD Ass'N U.S., http://www.ngaus.org/advocating-national-guard/evolving-role-citizensoldier (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (explaining that the National Guard is composed of 54
organizations in total, which includes: members or units of each state, the territories of Guam and
the Virgin Islands, plus the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.)
3. Sean M. Hardy, A FightingChance: The ProposedServicemembers Access to Justice Act
& Its PotentialEffects on Binding Arbitration Agreements, 10 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 329, 329-30
(2010).
4. See Elizabeth A. Leyda, The War(riors) at Home: Examining USERRA's Veterans'
Reemployment Protections When Hostility Follows Soldiers to the Workplace, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 851, 852-53 (2012) (explaining that the changing nature of warfare and the military's response
to this change has dramatically increased the tension between civilian life and military service).
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structure and purpose.s Under the Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act of 19946 ("USERRA"), it is unlawful for
employers to discriminate against servicemembers based on their
military service.
Furthermore, the USERRA guarantees returning
members of the military reinstatement to the same jobs they enjoyed
before service interrupted their private lives. The USERRA expressly
forbids retaliatory and related adverse discriminatory actions based on
military status,9 but its application remains unclear in other areas.10
Specifically, an issue that has emerged under USERRA is whether the
statute precludes mandatory arbitration provisions in employment
contracts."
With USERRA claims on the rise, it is increasingly
important to understand whether agreements to arbitrate USERRA
claims are enforceable. 12
When Michael Garrett was preparing for a combat deployment to
Iraq as a Marine Reserve Lieutenant Colonel, he understandably
expected to maintain his position at Circuit City and not receive
disparaging treatment because of his military status.1 3
However,
beginning in late 2002, when it became clear that United States military
action against Iraq was imminent,1 4 "he began to receive unjustified
criticism and discipline from his [Circuit City] supervisors," culminating
in his firing in 2003." Garrett brought suit against Circuit City under
the USERRA and alleged that he was terminated based solely on his
status as a Marine Reserve Officer.16 In response to the suit, the

5. See Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists' Reemployment
Rights: The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and Minnesota's

Military Leave Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 797, 801 (2004).
6. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §
4301-4333 (2006).
7. See id. § 4301(a)(3).
8. Id. § 4301(a)(2).
9. See id. § 4301(a)(3).
10. See id. § 4311(a) (explaining that the USERRA's antidiscrimination provision prohibits
an employer from denying initial employment, reemployment, or any other benefit of employment
to a person on the basis of membership in a uniformed service).
11. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 338.
12. Howard S. Suskin & Benjamin J. Wimrnmer, Arbitrability of USERRA Claims: Battle on
the

Home

Front,

CoRP.

COUNS.

(Oct.

15,

2008),

http://www.1aw.com/corporatecounseVPubArticleCCjspid=1202425266219&slretum=201303251
65114.
13. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 2006).
14. See U.S. Ready to Attack Iraq: General, CNN (Sept. 21, 2002, 9:03 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/21/iraq.franks/index.html.
15. Garrett,449 F.3d at 674.
16. Id.
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company claimed that a program adopted over a decade earlier that
required mandatory arbitration for any employee-employer disputes
applied.17 Garrett never signed an arbitration agreement, but he
acknowledged the policy and did not opt-out of the arbitration
provision." Nevertheless, based on the agreement, Circuit City argued
that Garrett could not sue in federal court to enforce a violation of his
rights under the USERRA. 1 9 Garrett alleged that section 4302(b) of the
20
USERRA precluded the enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
Specifically, section 4302(b) provides that the Act supersedes any
contract, agreement, or policy "that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any
2
manner any right or benefit provided ... ." under the USERRA. 1
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected Garrett's argument and held that his USERRA claims were
subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act
22
("FAA").
Garrett's story is similar to that of many veterans returning from
Afghanistan and Iraq.23 For instance, in one recent case, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a district court's order compelling arbitration under
USERRA where the plaintiff, who served in the United States Naval
Reserve, was fired after he informed the defendant company that he was
being recalled for active duty in Afghanistan.24 Overall, the strain on
private employers in the economic downturn has encouraged many
employers to resort to using arbitration agreements as an attempt to
circumvent USERRA.2 5 Although Congress enacted the USERRA to
ensure employment protections for military members, it did not
anticipate that the number of activated military Reservists would swell to

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (1994).
See Garrett, 449 F.3d at 681.
See, e.g., Christopher Harress, Special Report: Returning War on Terror Military

Veterans Find Promised Jobs are Gone and, Despite Laws, No Legal Help for Getting Rehired,

INT'L. Bus. TIMEs (July 12, 2013 10:04 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/special-report-returning-war(discussing the hardships that
terror-military-veterans-find-promised-jobs-are-gone-1344379
thousands of veterans face and their possible USERRA claims).
24. See Ziober v. BLB Res. Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2016).
25.

See Felisa Cardona, Arbitration Pact Cited as Defense in Vet Firing, DENVER POST (Dec.

25, 2007, 1:55 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2007/12/24/arbitration-pact-cited-as-defense-invet-firing/ (discussing Lockheed Martin's arbitration agreement and the proposal of the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007); Scott Canon, Answering The Call, Reservists Find Military Duty Clashes
With Job Protection, THE BUFF. NEWS, May 24, 2009, 12:01 AM).
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842,510 members over the past decade.26 This significant increase in
combat veterans has tested the effectiveness of the USERRA.27
Importantly, mandatory arbitration presents a distinct disadvantage
for military members due to the costs, limited discovery, absence of
juries, lack of neutrality, lack of any appellate process, and the effect of
military regulations upon their duties.2 8 More broadly, mandatory
arbitrations are highly private proceedings, as such, the decisions do not
become part of the public record, which means that employment
discrimination against returning veterans is hidden from the public.29
After Garrett, most federal courts determined that returning
servicemembers could not bring their employment discrimination claims
in federal court, chiefly because of the national policy strongly favoring
arbitration of such claims.30 These federal courts have mainly based
their pro-arbitration decisions on Supreme Court cases involving the
FAA. 3 1 However, such a construction of the USERRA acutely clashes
with the congressional intent behind the statute, as well as a number of
notable Supreme Court cases regarding veterans' employment laws.32
26. See 2013 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY (D.O.D., 2013),
http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2013-Demographics-Report.pdf;
see
also Mackenzie Carpenter, Reservist Status Can Be Liabilityfor Job Seekers, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
(Apr.
15,
2012,
9:29
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/business/businessnews/2012/04/15/Reservist-status-can-be-liability-for-jobseekers/stories/201204150239 (discussing the difficulty Reservists and Guard members face
because of discrimination against their status as military members).
27. See Carpenter,supra note 26.
28. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
29. See Barbara Kate Repa, Arbitration Pros and Cons, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-

encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2017).
30. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 560-61, 563 (6th Cir. 2008); see
also Hardy, supra note 3, at 331.
31. See Elizabeth S. Fenton and Shannon A.S. Quadros, Supreme Court Continues Down Pro

Arbitration

Road,

A.B.A.

(June

3,

2014),

http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/spring2014-0513-supremecourt-continues-pro-arbitration-recent-cases.html.
32. See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, POLICY
STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT (July 10, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html
[hereinafter EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE No. 915.002] ("The use of unilaterally
imposed agreements mandating binding arbitration of employment discrimination disputes as a
condition of employment harms both the individual civil rights claimant and the public interest in
eradicating discrimination. Those whom the law seeks to regulate should not be permitted to exempt
themselves from federal enforcement of civil rights laws. Nor should they be permitted to deprive
civil rights claimants of the choice to vindicate their statutory rights in the courts-an avenue of
redress determined by Congress to be essential to enforcement."); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.055, POLICY GUIDANCE ON VETERANS' PREFERENCE
UNDER TITLE VII, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/veteranspreference.html (last modified Aug.
23, 2007) [hereinafter EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.055] (explaining that
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As such, these recent decisions severely undermine the overarching
purpose behind the USERRA-to protect the employment rights of
military members.3 3
This paper argues that USERRA claims should be heard in court
rather than subjected to mandatory and binding arbitration. Because of
the USERRA's highly unique legislative history, which is reinforced by
the Supreme Court's noteworthy liberal approach to veterans'
3
employment rights and statutory construction, 4 this paper further
contends that the USERRA is simply not comparable to other federal
employment statutes, including other antidiscrimination statutes that
have been permitted to proceed through arbitration under the FAA. Part
II of this paper discusses the background of the USERRA, including its
history and intent. Part II also discusses arbitration and the FAA. Part
III explores the unresolved landscape of mandatory arbitration actions
brought pursuant to the USERRA, as well as the various approaches
taken by federal courts throughout the country. Part IV then discusses
the specific reasons USERRA claims should supersede mandatory
arbitration, including certain policy reasons. Finally, Part V contains
positive suggestions for how the problem can be ameliorated.
II.

THE USERRA,

ARBITRATION, AND

THE FAA

In order to understand the current conflict between the USERRA
and the FAA, it is important to establish a baseline understanding of the
relevant statutes.35 Section A reviews the history of the USERRA, how
it operates, and how the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute.
Section B explores how the modem military policies and deployment
tempo put veteran employees, especially Reservists, at a severe
disadvantage in the employment arena. Section C briefly reviews what
arbitration is and what the process entails, including its advantages and
disadvantages. Section D then discusses the FAA and the development
of the Supreme Court's strong pro-arbitration stance.

"[t]he federal government and virtually all of the states grant some form of employment preference

to veterans" and "both the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission and the courts have found
no Title VII violation where a statutory basis exists for an employment preference granted to
veterans. . . .").
33. See Laura Bettenhausen, The FAA and the USERRA: Pro-Arbitration Policies Can
Undermine Federal Protection of Military Personnel, 1 J. DIsP. RESOL. 267, 272 n.73, 273-74

(2007).
34. Id. at 273-75, 278-79.
35. Id. at 268, 272.
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The USERRA

The first effort by Congress to provide legislative protections to
military members in employment occurred during World War II when
Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940
("STSA"). 6
The STSA required employers to keep employment
positions open for military members called away for military service.37
In later years, the STSA was modified and renamed and eventually
became the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act ("VRRA") during the
Vietnam War.38 Congress specifically modified the VRRA to provide
broader protections for servicemembers largely in response to reports
that servicemembers, particularly Reservists and Guard members, faced
increased discrimination that had not been adequately addressed through
previous legislative attempts.3 9
This discrimination was mainly
manifested through the denial of promotions or termination due to
military obligations. 40 The VRRA allowed a veteran to ask for a leave
of absence from a private employer to go on active duty and guaranteed
the veteran the same position upon return, with the same seniority,
status, pay, and vacation as if they had not been absent.41
Against the backdrop of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
subsequent end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, the United States
readjusted its national defense strategy.42 The new strategy became
known as the Total Force policy. 4 3 This monumental change in strategy
involved cutbacks and an increased reliance on the Reserve component
of the military." Unlike the Vietnam conflict in which Reserve and
36. See Daniel J. Bugbee, Employers Beware: Violating USERRA Through Improper PreEmployment Inquiries, 12 CHAP. L. REv. 279, 281 (2008).
37. Id. at 281-82 (applying to specified circumstances such as when the servicemember was
still capable of performing job duties and applied for reemployment within forty days of returning
from this service).
38. Id. at 282; see also Penni P. Bradshaw & Richard E. Fay, "When Johnny Comes
Marching Home Again": The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act and Employer Obligations to

Military Reservists, 15 AM. J. TRAL ADvoc. 79, 80 (1991) (explaining the history of the VRRA
and how it works).
39. See Bradshaw & Fay, supra note 38, at 81- 82; Bugbee, supra note 36, at 282.
40. Bugbee, supra note 36, at 282.
41. See Woodman v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 258 F.3d 1372, 1375-76 (Fed Cir. 2001) (quoting
38 U.S.C. § 2024(d) (1988)).
42. See Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists' Rights in
Furtheranceof the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST. THOMAs L.

REV. 859, 867-68 (2002).
43. See id. at 868; Hartzell, supra note 1, at 539-40.
44. See Hartzell, supra note 1, at 540; Fernandez, supra note 42, at 868 (explaining that the
"post-cold war reserves were not merely an appendage to the active duty personnel, now they were
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Guard forces were noticeably absent, the Total Force policy was
intended to amplify the Guard and Reserve components and integrate
them more closely with regular active forces.45 More specifically, "[i]t
was not until the [advent of] the Global War on Terror, including [the
military] involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the effectiveness of
the Total Force policy's heavy reliance on the Reserve [and Guard
forces] was truly called into question.A6
To enable the new strategy, Congress replaced the VRRA by
passing the USERRA in 1994 in order to address the new realities of
military policy. 47

The chief intention of Congress in enacting the

USERRA was to "prohibit discrimination against persons because of
Congress further
their service [or status] in the uniformed services.
intended for the USERRA to encourage non-career military service and
minimize employment disadvantages and disruptions due to military
service.4 9 USERRA has unique protections and rights not found in other
employment discrimination statutes.50 USERRA is unique among antidiscrimination statutes because it has protections and rights that other
Furthermore,
employment discrimination statutes do not have. 5 '
USERRA contains incredibly broad powers, which extend to all
employers in the United States.52 The Act symbolizes Congress'
promise that military members "will not suffer negative employment
repercussions based on their military service." 53 In order to accomplish
its objectives, Congress designed the USERRA in three main parts to
provide essential protections: "(1) a prohibition on employment
discrimination against service members; (2) reemployment rights for
an entity with their own roles and missions supplementing the 'Total Force."').
45. See Hartzell, supra note 1, at 539-40 ("[R]eserve forces were envisioned in the vanguard,
fighting alongside active duty units.").
46. Leyda, supra note 4, at 858-59.
47. See Hardy, supranote 3, at 334.
48. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(3) (2012).
49. See id. § 4301(a)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 53 (1993), as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2486 ("If the United States is going to rely on reservists to shoulder a larger
share of our national defense, those reservists must know that their jobs are secure while they are
serving their country.").
50. See Bugbee, supranote 36, at 284.
51.

See Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers,

and the Law, 19 HEALTH L. 1, 9 (2007) (describing the unique antidiscrimination provisions under
the USERRA).
52. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(i) (2012). The statute specifies that employer means any
person, institution, organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages for work performed or that
has control over employment opportunities. Id.
53.

Andrew P. Sparks, From the Desert to the Courtroom: The Uniformed Services

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 773, 775 (2010).
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persons absent from employment [due to] military service; and (3)
perseveration of benefits for persons absent from employment [due to]
military service." 5 4 In recommending passage of the bill, the Committee
on Veterans' Affairs made clear that it "intend[ed] that these antidiscrimination provisions be broadly construed and strictly enforced." 55
In order to assert a servicemember's USERRA rights, a USERRA
plaintiff has two options. 56 The first option is that a USERRA plaintiff
can file a claim with the Secretary of Labor, which can then be referred
to the Attorney General, who may prosecute.57 The second option is that
a USERRA plaintiff can pursue a civil action directly in federal court. 8
Notwithstanding whether USERRA claims are filed by individuals or by
the United States on their behalf, the statute expressly provides
jurisdiction against private employers to the federal district courts.59
USERRA also provides a number of remedies such as equitable relief,
lost wages and benefits, and liquidated damages in the event the
employer is willfully noncompliant.6 In addition, USERRA allows the
courts to award reasonable attorney's fees and court costs if the
USERRA plaintiff is successful. 6 1
Statutory interpretation by the United States Supreme Court
establishes USERRA to be more protective than other discrimination
statutes. 62 Historically, the Court has construed statutes strongly in favor
of the veteran plaintiff.63 In Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., the Court explained that the veteran was "to gain by his service
for his country an advantage which the law withheld from those who
stayed behind."" The Court stressed that a "liberal .. . construction for
54.

Anthony H. Green, Reemployment Rights Under the Uniform Services Employment and

Reemployment Act (USERRA): Who's Bearing the Cost?, 37 IND. L. REV. 213, 216 (2003); see also
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2012).
55. H.R. REP. No. 103-65, at 23 (1993), as reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2456.
56. See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a)(l)-(2) (2012).
57. Id. § 4323(a)(1). After sixty days, the Attorney General must make a decision whether to
appear on behalf of, and act as attorney for, the person on whose behalf the complaint is submitted;
the USERRA plaintiff must then be notified in writing of such decision. Id § 4323(a)(2).
58. See id. § 4323(a)(3).
59. Id. § 4323(b)(1).
60. Id. § 4323(d)-(e).
61. Id § 4323(h)(2).
62. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946).
63. See id. at 285; Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980).
64. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 284. The Supreme Court in Fishgold interpreted one of the
predecessor statutes to USERRA, specifically section 8(c) of the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, which protected a veteran against discharge within one year after restoration of his job
following military service. Id. at 284-85. This case established the Fishgold "escalator" principle
for the statutory scheme that Congress had established regarding veteran protections. Id. The
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the benefit of the veteran" was therefore necessary.65 The Fishgold
Court explained that instead of reading various sections in a vacuum,
separate provisions should be treated as "parts of an organic whole and
give each as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as a
harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits."66
Three decades later, the Court in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis,
reiterated that veterans' statutes should be broadly read to afford the
veteran the greatest benefit.6 7 In this case, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.68 Significantly,
the Supreme Court held that the Act was designed to enable veterans to
transition to civilian life as easily as possible by ensuring that the jobs
Once again, the
they held prior to their service were still available.
Court stressed that veterans' employment statutes were to be broadly
applied to ensure the veteran benefited.
Ever since World War II, the Court has liberally construed
veterans' employment statutes in order to strongly favor the veteran
employee-plaintiff.7 1 Furthermore, lower courts have mostly followed
the Supreme Court's guidance by giving the USERRA's application
requirement liberal construction.72 The Department of Labor (DOL)
similarly adheres to a "liberally construed" standard regarding USERRA
protections for veterans. 73

principle provides, "[the returning veteran] does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point

he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his
position continuously during the war." Id.
65. Id.at285.
66. Id.
67. See Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1977).
68. See id. at 583-89.
69. Id. at 583.
70. See id at 584.
71. See Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980) (interpreting USERRA's
predecessor, Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974); see also Rogers v. City

of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the USERRA's predecessor
statutes and judicial interpretation of such statutes).

72. See, e.g., Gordon v. Wawa, Inc., 388 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); Hill v.
Michelin N.A., 252 F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Because USERRA was enacted to protect
the rights of veterans and members of the uniformed services, it must be broadly construed in favor

of its military beneficiaries.").
73. See Matt Crotty, The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and
Washington State's Veteran's Affairs Statute: Still Short on Protecting Reservists from Hiring

Discrimination, 43 GONZ. L. REv. 169, 174 (2008). In 2005, the DOL released a final set of
Regulations that provided guidance to civilian employers of military members protected by the
USERRA. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 Fed. Reg.
75,246 (Dec.' 19, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002). In the Supplementary Information
section of the Regulations, the DOL, citing
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Notwithstanding these liberal or expansive interpretations of the
USERRA,7 4 the interaction of the USERRA and the FAA has yielded a
more grudging interpretation of veterans' rights. 75
The USERRA
includes a murky relation-to-other-laws provision, which has been
difficult for courts to apply. Section 4302(a) provides as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or
diminish any Federal or State law (including any local
law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan,
practice, or other matter that establishes a right or
benefit that is more beneficial to, or is in addition to, a
right or benefit provided for such person in this
chapter.n
Section 4302(b), however,
supersedes any State law (including any local law or
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice,
or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any
manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter,
including the establishment of additional prerequisites to
the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such
benefit.7 8
In other words, section 4302(a) permits agreements and laws that
make veterans better off, while section 4302(b) prohibits agreements that
make veterans worse off. 9 In explaining the latter provision, the House
Report states in no uncertain terms that "resort to mechanisms such as
grievance procedures or arbitration . . is not required," and that "any
arbitration decision shall not be binding as a matter of law." 80
The House Report further states that "[a]n express waiver of future
statutory rights, such as one that an employer might wish to require as a

interpretation of veteran employment rights. Id. Specifically, the DOL Regulations state, "[the]
interpretive maxim [favoring veterans shall] apply with full force and effect in construing USERRA
and these regulations." Id.
74. See Crotty, supranote 73, at 174.
75. See Bettenhausen, supranote 33, at 268.
76. See Crotty, supranote 73, at 173-74.
77. 38 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (2012).
78. Id. § 4302(b).
79. See id. § 4302(a)-(b).
80. H.R. REP. No. 103-65, at 20 (1993), as reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453.
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condition of employment, would be contrary to the public policy
embodied in the Committee bill and would be void." 81 The House
Report favorably cited Kidder v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.82 In Kidder, a
federal district court in Florida rejected an employer's contention that a
servicemember waives his right to seek court relief under the VRRA by
invoking a grievance procedure and processing his service-related
grievance through several steps of the procedure. 83 The Kidder court
explained that even if the servicemember had proceeded to arbitration
and received an adverse ruling, his right to file a lawsuit under the Act
still would have been preserved because federal courts are the exclusive
forum for the vindication of veterans' rights. 84 Furthermore, the DOL
regulations state that section 4302(b) "includes a prohibition against the
waiver in an arbitration agreement of an employee's right to bring a
USERRA suit in Federal court."85
B. Modern Problems for Veteran Employees: The Rise of the
PerpetualDeployment
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the protracted
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have put Reserve and Guard forces in a
perilous employment position.8686 Over 850,000 Reservists and Guard
members have been activated since September 11, 2001, with over
50,000 currently on active duty as of 2013." At one point, Guard and
Reserve troops accounted for forty percent of the frontline troops in Iraq
and over fifty percent in Afghanistan." Furthermore, some states have
had seventy-five percent of their National Guard troops activated and
serving in combat roles, the highest rate in American history. 89 These

81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Kidder v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1064-65 (S.D. Fla. 1978)).
83. Kidder, 469 F. Supp. at 1063.
84. Id. at 1065.
85. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 Fed. Reg.
75,246 (Dec. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002).
86. See Sparks, supra note 53, at 781-83; see also Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12 (noting
that the recent wars have put employers and military members on notice that a combat deployment

is highly likely).
87. Memorandum from Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman, Reserve Forces Pol'y Board on Reserve
Component (RC) Duty Status Reform to the Secretary of Defense (July 16, 2013),
http://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/RFPBDuty Statusrptto SECDEF.pdf (noting that
there are currently 53,642 National Guard and Reservists activated).
88. ILONA MEAGHER, MOVING A NATION TO CARE: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
AND AMERICA'S RETURNING TROOPS 95 (Ig Publishing, 1st ed. 2007).

89.

Id.
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military members have repeatedly deployed for time periods of up to
fifteen months. 90 After the election of President Barack Obama in 2008,
the United States continued to rely on Reservists and Guard members.91
Since 2009 the Administration called 40,453 reservists for active duty. 9 2
"Modem trends indicate that reliance on reservist forces . . is likely to
continue due to cost effectiveness and fundamental changes in military
structure and purpose." 9 3
National Guard and Reservists face other significant challenges.94
Generally, they are required to participate in four to eight weeks of
training before they deploy to combat. 95 As a result, a twelve-month
deployment actually means they spend over a year and a half away from
their families, placing a lot of strain on familial relationships.96 One
commentator notes that National Guardsmen and Reservists face a very
difficult transition from the battlefield to the civilian sector because they
must quickly leave the familiar support structure of the military shortly
after their return.9 7

In addition, the transition is complicated because

many of these military members live in suburban or rural areas away
from major centers of military resources. 98 As a result, mental health
treatment for afflictions such as post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")
can be incredibly burdensome. 99 In addition to combat deployments and
the necessary training obligations, National Guardsmen are also

90.
POST

See Ann Scott Tyson & Josh White, StrainedArmy Extends Tours To 15 Months, WASH.
(Apr.
12,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/04/1 1/AR2007041100615.html.
91. See Sparks, supra note 53, at 781.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 782; see also Wedlund, supra note 5, at 801.
94. Sparks, supra note 53, at 782 ("The most significant ramifications of large-scale

mobilizations of reservists occur in the reservists' work and family life.").
95. See Holly Seesel, et al., Consequences of Combat: A Review of Haunted by Combat:
UnderstandingPTSD in War Veterans Including Women, Reservists, and Those Coming Backfrom
Iraq; and Moving a Nation to Care: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and America's Returning

Troops, 1 VETERANS L. REv. 254, 256 (2009).
96. Id. (explaining that this additional time is significant because stress is highest before the
deployment). The United States Army has recognized the strain that this has had on
servicemembers.

See Thom Shanker, Army Is Worried by Rising Stress of Return Tours to Iraq,

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/washington/06military.html
("Among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four show signs of
anxiety, depression or acute stress, according to an official Army survey of soldiers' mental
health.").
97. See Seesel, et al., supra note 95, at 256-57.
98. See Tiffany Cartwright, To Carefor Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle: The Recent
Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 295, 300

(2011).
99.

Id. at 302.
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routinely required to take part in state emergency response, disaster
relief, and law enforcement missions. 0 0
Unfortunately, the heavy reliance on Reservist forces has had
particularly devastating ramifications in the employment arena. 0 1 In
many cases, civilian employers can be insensitive or downright hostile to
their veteran employees' wartime experiences; oftentimes such employer
sentiments can result in terminations or demotions for the veteran
employees.1 02 "The federal government also reported that 16,000 formal
and informal complaints were filed by service members who
encountered problems getting rehired when they returned from military
service to their jobs during the years of 2004 and 2005."'03 The
Pentagon's Office of Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve,
which assists veteran employees in exercising their rights under the
USERRA, received more than 13,000 calls for assistance in 2007, and
around 8,000 in the first half of 2008.104 According to a Workforce
Management online survey, sixty-five percent of employers would not
hire an active Guard member or Reservist. 05 "Despite the USERRA
guidelines, created to protect against hiring or re-employment
discrimination, employers worry that they might not be able to afford the
cost of absence for training obligations or deployment, or be able to
rehire a returning veteran.,,' 06 Moreover, the Pentagon has reported that
over ten percent of returning servicemembers face difficulties returning

100. Active Duty vs. Reserve or National Guard, VETERAN AFFAIRS (Apr. 6, 2012),
https://www.va.gov/vetsinworkplace/docs/emactiveReserve.html; see also Carpenter, supra note

26 (noting that the combat deployments and state emergency responsibilities make many military
members a perceived liability in the job market).
101.

Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian

Employers Pay the Pricefor NationalDefense?, 59 A.F. L. REv. 287, 289 (2007).
102.

See, e.g., Judy Greenwald, Company That Fired Marine Hit With a Disability Lawsuit,

BUS.
INS.
(Apr.
24,
2014,
12:00
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/N-EWSO6/140429901/Company-that-firedMarine-with-PTSD-hit-with-disability-lawsuit (detailing the story of a U.S. Marine Corps Veteran
who was ultimately terminated due to PTSD).
103.

Mathew B. Tully & Ariel E. Solomon, Ensuring the Employment Rights of America's

Citizen-Soldiers, 35 HuM. RTS. 6, 6 (2008).
104. See Pam Belluck, After Duty, New Chance for Old Job, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/21/us/21broker.html.
105. See Ted Daywalt, Over 65 Percent of Companies Won't Hire Active Members of the
National Guard and Reserve, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-daywalt/65-

percent-of-companies-w-b 1418721.html (last updated June 12, 2012) (arguing that this explains
why many deployed National Guard brigades have had unemployment rates ranging from thirty to
sixty-eight percent).
106. Michael Hess, Veterans' Unemployment - A National Disgrace, CBS MONEYWATCH
(May 18, 2012, 12:30 PM), www.cbsnews.com/news/veterans-unemployment-a-national-disgrace/.
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to work and asserting their rights under the USERRA. 07
The strain between veteran employees and many employers acutely
worsened during the economic downturn in 2009.108 Because of the
financial strain, many employers felt that Reservists and Guardsmen had
highly disruptive and unpredictable schedules that created
insurmountable
difficulties. 1 09
In recent years,
returning
servicemembers have experienced "increasing problems reintegrating
into the workforce, as evidenced by disproportionately high
unemployment rates among veterans compared to" their civilian
counterparts, 1 0 "as well as increasing numbers of employment-related
inquiries and complaints" filed with the Departments of Labor and
Defense."' For these reasons, a growing number of employers "refuse
to reemploy their former service-member employees, while others
[actively] avoid hiring Reservists and National Guardsmen at all.""l 2
Even if the servicemembers are rehired, many assert that they are not
really welcome at their old jobs, where they regularly face adverse
changes in employment and disparaging treatment.1 13 It is this baseline
antagonism toward Reserve and Guard employees and their military
service obligations that has led to the fairly widespread use of mandatory
arbitration provisions for USERRA actions.1 14
C. Arbitration:A BriefOverview
"[E]mployees who have agreed to arbitrate workplace disputes may
not file employment discrimination suits in court."115

Instead, the

decision to arbitrate "reallocates jurisdiction over employment [disputes]
from the public judicial system to a private forum," known as arbitration
hearings.' 16 In arbitration hearings, a third party, in most cases the
arbitrator or arbitration panel, "reviews the parties' arguments and issues
107. See David Ogles, Life During (and After) Wartime: Enforceability of Waivers Under
USERRA, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 425 n.7 (2012) (noting that there are many reasons to suspect
"that such occurrences between employers and returning servicemembers will rise in the near

future, as troops return home due to recent withdrawals from Iraq and Europe").
108. See Leyda, supranote 4, at 853-54.
109. See id. at 854.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 855.
113. Id.
114. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 671 (5th Cir. 2006).
115.

Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals ofEmployment DiscriminationLaw, 56

WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 397 (1999).
116. Id.
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a decision."1 17 Unlike judges, "[a]rbitrators are not officials of the
state... 1.""' Instead, arbitrators "are individuals acting in a private
capacity who are selected by the parties, commonly because of [their]
experience in a particular industry or knowledge of the subject... . 19
Arbitration proceedings use rules of evidence and procedure but
oftentimes "use simpler or more flexible rules than a court would." 1 2 0
Generally, "[a]rbitration can be either 'binding' or 'non-binding."l21 If
arbitration is non-binding, the arbitrator's decision is only effective after
the parties know what the decision is and agree to its resolution. 122 "if
the arbitration decision is 'binding,' the parties agree in advance to abide
by the arbitrator's decision," regardless of the judgment reached. 123
There is also an important distinction between "mandatory" and
"voluntary" arbitrations.1 2 4 In mandatory arbitration, employment
contracts contain provisions that designate arbitration as the exclusive
remedy to resolve disputes after the contract becomes effective. 125 In the
event that a dispute arises, these provisions prevent the complaining
party from filing suit in court, leaving arbitration as the only available
remedy. 12 6 In contrast, voluntary arbitration allows the complaining
party to either file suit or pursue arbitration. 127 For these reasons,
"mandatory, binding arbitration" leads to the most abuse because the
parties are required to use arbitration to resolve any and all future
disagreements by contractual agreement, subject to the arbitrator's final
Further, with these "mandatory, binding arbitration"
decision. 128
agreements, the parties have no recourse for seeking relief in court or via
other methods of dispute resolution.1 29 As such, if a party is not satisfied
with the outcome of the arbitration, the party usually has no alternative
remedies. 30
In determining whether a dispute is subject to arbitration, courts

117.

Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON

LEGIS. 281, 283 (2002).
118. Moohr, supra note 115, at 402.
119. Id.
120. Feingold, supra note 117, at 283.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 284.
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usually engage in a two-step process. 13 1 First, the court must determine
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. 13 2 If
so, the court must then determine whether the dispute at hand fits within
the parameters of the arbitration agreement.1 3 3
Some common criticisms of mandatory arbitration agreements are
that they eliminate access to courts and juries, lack neutrality, have high
costs, reduce claimants' remedies, eliminate class actions, and curtail
discovery.1 3 4 "Arbitrators generally have no obligation to provide a
factual or legal discussion of their decision in a written opinion.""' One
commentator argues that:
[fjederal courts are preferable forums for employees to
have their complaints resolved for multiple reasons: (1)
discovery is broader in federal courts; (2) federal judges,
as opposed to industry insiders, are more qualified to
interpret federal statutory language and meaning; (3)
written opinions are needed for consistency in statutory
application; (4) federal courts may impose a broad range
of remedies; and (5) federal court oversight is more
likely to produce broad industry changes.13 6
Meanwhile, proponents of arbitration argue that it decreases
litigation costs and provides timely resolutions of disputes. 13 7 Moreover,
proponents assert that "mandatory arbitration offers a more egalitarian
system of dispute resolution."1 38 Arbitration is faster, cheaper, and less
formal than litigation, making it more readily accessible for all,
including low-income employees.1 39
131.

See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters. Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002)

(explaining the process that federal courts use to determine whether the contracting parties agreed to
arbitrate).

132.
133.

Id.
Id.

134.

Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitutefor the

Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 19 (2003) [hereinafter Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of
Mandatory Arbitration].

135. James v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 14-cv-03889-RMW, 2015 WL 720195, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015).
136. See Mary Rebecca Tyre, Arbitration: An Employer's License to Steal Title VII Claims?,
52 ALA. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2001).
137.

See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process and Other Constitutional

Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2011).
138. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness,84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247,
1251 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitrationand Fairness].

139.

See id.
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Nevertheless, mandatory arbitration of employment claims has been
14 0
One
criticized as being skewed in favor of the employer defendant.
protects
privacy
of
veil
a
that
is
employer
the
for
notable advantage
arbitrations from public scrutiny because arbitrations are held out of the
public's view. 14 1 Indeed, arbitrations are usually private proceedings in
which papers are filed with arbitrators and are not part of any public
record.1 4 2 Additionally, the proceedings occur in private offices instead
of public courtrooms, and the media is usually much less interested in
covering arbitration proceedings. 143 Arbitration outcomes are usually
confidential as well. 1" For these reasons, businesses have traditionally
favored binding arbitration because of the privacy surrounding the
14 5
In a
dispute resolution and the presence of neutral decision makers.
policy statement opposing mandatory arbitration of discrimination
claims, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
argues that the employer has "a valuable structural advantage because it
is a 'repeat player."' 1 4 6 Put simply, "the employer is a party to
arbitration in all disputes with its employees," 1 47 whereas the employee
is a "one-shot" player in the particular employment dispute. As a
consequence, the employee is less likely to make an informed selection
of arbitrators compared to the employer; the employer also has the
ability to track the arbitrator's record. 148 Further, the arbitrator may very
well be biased in favor of the employer because the employer, and not
the employee, is a potential source of future business for the arbitrator.149
Furthermore, the unavailability of discovery evidence skews the system
strongly in favor of the employer defendant, especially because the
140.

See id. at 1254.

141.

See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and

Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 61 (1997)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business]. The EEOC argues that the
private nature of arbitration undermines the overriding purpose of discrimination laws: "[t]he

[p]ublic [njature [o]f [t]he [j]udicial [p]rocess [e]nables [t]he [p]ublic, [h]igher [c]ourts, [a]nd
Congress [tio [e]nsure [t]hat [t]he [d]iscrimination [l]aws [a]re [p]roperly [i]nterpreted [a]nd
[a]pplied." EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, supra note 32.
142. See Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to ProtectBig Business, supranote 141, at 61.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145.

See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.

1631, 1635 (2005) [hereinafter Stemlight, CreepingMandatory Arbitration].
146.

EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE No. 915.002, supranote 32.

147.
148.

Id.
See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 936
.

(1979) ("[A]n arbitrator could improve his chances of future selection by deciding favorably to
institutional defendants . .

149.

Id.
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"

plaintiff has the burden of production of evidence that the employer
defendant is very likely possesses.
D. The FAA
American courts generally disfavored the use of arbitration to
resolve legal disputes in the early 1900s.'51 This systemic antagonism
toward arbitration spurred the passage of the FAA, which was signed
into law by President Calvin Coolidge on February 12, 1925.152 The
FAA expressly states that written arbitration agreements are "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity of any contract., 153 Beginning in the 1980s, the Court began
consistently holding that arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA
were enforceable. 154 Importantly, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,'1s the
Court held that the FAA superseded any state laws barring the
arbitration of any disputes stemming from contracts rooted in state
law. 156 In another case decided in the 1980s, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,157 the Supreme Court held that the
arbitration of statutory claims does not require the abdication of
substantive rights, but instead is an agreement to resolve the dispute in
an alternative forum.'s In Mitsubishi, the Court also established that "if
Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute
to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history." 159
The Court expanded upon Mitsubishi in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.' 60 In Gilmer, the plaintiff filed suit in
150. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Printto ProtectBig Business, supra note 141, at 61.
151. See id. at 73-74.
152. See Feingold, supra note 117, at 284. The FAA, originally enacted in 1925, was
reenacted and codified as Title 9 of the United States Code. See id. at 281 n.4.
153. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
154. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("[T]he Courts
of Appeals have ... consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree.").
155. Southland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984).
156. See id. at 10 ("In enacting [section] 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."). In Southland,
the Supreme Court held the FAA trumped any state laws barring the use of arbitration in contracts
drafted under state law under the Supremacy Clause. Id.
157. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). In Gilmer, the Court
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federal court alleging that his termination violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and was compelled to
enter arbitration under a prior agreement. 161 The Court concluded that
the plaintiffs claim was covered by the arbitration clause and that
arbitration was his sole remedy.162 The Court found that nothing in the
163
ADEA or its underlying policy would preclude mandatory arbitration.
Here, the Supreme Court reiterated that claims brought under statutes are
subject to arbitration pursuant to the FAA except in circumstances where
the party arguing that it is not subject to arbitration can demonstrate that
Congress' intent was to foreclose a judicial waiver under the specific
The Court explained that the inquiry into
statute at issue.1"
Congressional intent "must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."' 6 5 The Gilmer decision "shocked
many employers and employees, who had previously assumed that
public policy concerns would prevent courts from compelling employees
to resolve employment discrimination claims through binding
arbitration."' 66
The Supreme Court has remained unwaveringly in favor of
68
arbitrations in recent years. 67 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,1
the Court held that the FAA applied to all employment contracts, unless
the contract was explicitly exempt under the FAA.' 6 After Circuit City,
it became common for courts to enforce boilerplate, mandatory
arbitration provisions, even when the employee had no meaningful
ability to reject binding arbitration. 70 In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc.,'7 1 the Court held that the FAA provides the exclusive
acknowledged that the FAA was enacted "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements ... and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Id. at
24.
161. See id. at 23-24.
162. Id. at 35.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 26.
165. Id.
166. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration andFairness,supranote 134, at 1637-38.
167. See id. at 1638. Likewise, state courts are strongly pro-arbitration. See, e.g., Aguillard v.
Auction Mgmt. Corp., 908 So. 2d 1, 18 (La. 2005) (holding that resolution of any doubt concerning
whether a dispute should be arbitrated should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
168. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
169. Id. at 122-23.
170. Kathryn A. & David C. Vladeck, Contracting(Out) Rights, 36 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 803,
819 (2009) ("In the aftermath of Circuit City, courts have routinely enforced boilerplate, mandatory
arbitration provisions in employment contracts, even where there is clear evidence that, due to the
disparity in bargaining power, the employee had no meaningful right to reject binding arbitration.").
171. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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grounds for judicial review, vacatur, and modification, and that such
grounds may not be modified by contract. 17 2 The court noted that the
FAA permits parties to tailor many features of arbitration by contract,
including the way arbitrators are chosen, what their qualifications should
be, and which issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and choice of
substantive law.1 73 In 2011, the Court issued its decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,174 in which the Court held that the FAA
preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration agreements containing
class action waivers. 175 Since its decision in Concepcion, the Supreme
Court has issued three additional decisions broadly reaffirming its
commitment to arbitration. 17 6 It is this highly favorable approach toward
arbitration agreements by the Supreme Court and Congress that has
largely been used to justify the mandatory arbitration of USERRA
claims. 177
III.

THE

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE

USERRA AND THE FAA

Even though there is not much case law regarding mandatory
arbitration under the USERRA, a number of courts across the country
have addressed the particular concern.' 78 The case law over the issue
can be broken down into two distinct categories: pre-Garrettdecisions
and Garrett and its progeny.1 79 This part explains and deconstructs the
172. Id. at 578.
173. Id. at 586.
174. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
175. See id. at 341, 352.
176. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 531, 533 (2012) (vacating a
decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that held unenforceable all pre-injury
arbitration agreements applying to claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against nursing
homes); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98-99 (2012) (holding that Credit Repair
Organization Act ("CROA") provisions, requiring credit repair organizations to disclose to
consumers their right to sue for violations of CROA and prohibiting waiver of any right under
CROA, did not preclude enforcement of an arbitration agreement; required arbitration agreement in

credit card application to be enforced according to its terms). In CompuCredit, the Court again
reiterated its simple bright-line test to be used when a court is faced with determining the
arbitrability of a federal claim: If the federal statute does not expressly prohibit arbitration, the FAA
controls and claims brought under that statute are arbitrable. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18,
22 (2011) (confirming that "when a complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the
[FAA] requires courts to 'compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims .. . even where the result

would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums."').
177. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., 565 U.S. at 532-33; CompuCredit Corp., 565 U.S. at 10305; KPMG LLP, 565 U.S. at 22.
178. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).
179. See id. at 563. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006);
Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337-38 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Kitts v. Menards, Inc., 519
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relevant case law.
A. Pre-GarrettDecisions
Several federal district courts addressed the issue and refused to
compel arbitration of USERRA claims under an otherwise applicable
arbitration agreement.'" In Breletic v. CACI, Inc.,'81 a federal district
court in Georgia found that the USERRA expressly grants the right to
pursue claims in a judicial forum and therefore preempts an arbitration
agreement.1 82 The plaintiff in Breletic was an operations research
18 3
As
analyst employed by CACI, an information technology company.
a
to
sign
required
was
a condition of his employment, the plaintiff
184
He signed the agreement in
mandatory arbitration agreement.
February of 2000.185 In October of 2001, the plaintiff was ordered to
active duty in the United States Army. 186 Upon release from active duty,
he was told his former job had been eliminated, and he was denied
reemployment notwithstanding the fact that CACI was advertising for
The
"positions nearly identical to that which he had in 2001.",8
plaintiff filed a USERRA complaint in federal court in November of
2004 alleging that the company had discriminated and retaliated against
him on account of his military service.1 88 The plaintiff was then offered
a new position and required to sign another arbitration agreement in
2004.189 The new arbitration agreement provided that "[t]he arbitrator,
and only the arbitrator, will decide any and all disputes regarding
whether a claim is arbitrable."l 90 The 2004 arbitration agreement also
expressly provided that it superseded any previous employee
agreements.'91 The question before the court in Breletic was whether the
F. Supp. 2d 837, 837, 844 (N.D. Ind. 2007); Lopez v. Dillard's Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D.
Kan. 2005).
180. See, e.g., Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1337; Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248; Roslyn v.
Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 05-0441, 2005 WL 1529937, *3-4, n.2 (D. Minn. June 29, 2005)
(unpublished) (In Roslyn, the court explained that it was persuaded by the legislative history and the
underlying purpose of the USERRA).
181. Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
182. See id. at 1337.
183. Id. at 1331.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1332.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1333.
191. Id. at 1336.
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arbitration agreement foreclosed the plaintiffs right to pursue his
USERRA claim in federal court or whether he had to submit them to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement he had signed. 192 After
a thorough canvassing of the case law of the FAA, the court then
focused on the text of the USERRA and its legislative history.1 93 The
court concluded, pursuant to the text and legislative history of the
statute, that "Congress intended to grant certain rights to those who serve
in the armed forces" and those rights included the "right to bring [a
USERRA claim] in a judicial forum."1 94 The court relied on language in
the House Committee Report that states "[a]n express waiver of future
statutory rights, such as one that an employer might wish to require as a
condition of employment, would be contrary to the public policy
embodied in the Committee bill and would be void" to reach the
conclusion that Congress' intent that a judicial forum waiver should not
be considered enforceable.' 9s
In Lopez v. Dillard's,Inc., the plaintiff was employed at a Dillard's
store in Wichita, Kansas, and was a member of the Kansas National
Guard.' 96 In 2003, the plaintiff received notice that she was being called
for active duty to serve in Iraq. 197 The plaintiff was informed by the
store that her job would be waiting for her when she returned from her
combat deployment.1 98 However, after the plaintiff returned, the store
forced her to reapply for her old position;' 99 she was never hired back in
her former position or in any other capacity. 2 00 The plaintiff then filed a
USERRA claim, and the store moved to compel arbitration. 2 0 1 The court
rejected the employer's motion to compel arbitration and held that the
arbitration agreement at issue was not permissible under the USERRA
because it created a burden to the employee's USERRA rights.202 The
court noted that section 4302(b) supersedes any agreement that imposes
additional "prerequisites to the exercise of any . .. right or the receipt of
any . . benefit" provided by the act.203 The court then found that the
192.
193.
194.
195.
2453).
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 1337.
See id at 1336.
See id. at 1335, 1338.
See id. at 1337 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-65 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
Lopez v. Dillard's, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1245 (D. Kan. 2005).
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id at 1246.
Id. at 1248-49.
Id. at 1247.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss2/6

22

Kelley: All Quiet on the Employment Front: Mandatory Arbitration Under th
2017]

MANDATORY ARBITRATION UNDER THE USERRA

389

arbitration agreement constituted an impermissible prerequisite because
it mandated that before exercising her rights under USERRA and
obtaining the relief to which she is entitled thereunder, plaintiff must
participate in an arbitration proceeding.20 In so ruling, the court found
that the plain language of section 4302(b) requires that the arbitration
agreement be superseded by the USERRA.2 05
B. Garrett v. Circuit City Stores and Its Progeny
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
issued its decision in Garrett.206 This case marked the first time a federal
circuit court addressed whether the USERRA forecloses mandatory
arbitration agreements.207 The unique background of the case is highly
illustrative. Michael Garrett had worked for Circuit City since 1994;208
he was also a Marine Reserve officer. 2 09 After Garrett began working at
Circuit City, the company implemented a new system to resolve
The company-wide system, called the
employment disputes. 2 10
Associate Issue Resolution Program, was designed to require
employment disputes to be resolved using mandatory arbitration; the
program was enforced in accordance with the FAA. 2 1 Even though
Garrett acknowledged in writing that he received information on the
arbitration program, he did not opt out of the arbitration system during
Garrett alleged that his
the required thirty-day time period.212
supervisors began to unjustifiably criticize and discipline him during the
period in which the United States military was preparing for combat in
Iraq, between December 2002 and March 2003.213 In March 2003,
around the advent of the Iraq War, Garrett was fired; 2 14 he contended he
was terminated exclusively because of his servicemember status.215
Garrett filed a USERRA suit against Circuit City in a Texas federal
204. Id. at 1248. The court noted that "[s]ince that type of proceedifig was not addressed in the
USERRA, it stands as an additional prerequisite to the exercise ofplaintiff's rights and the receipt
of any benefits to which she might be entitled under the act." Id.
205. Id. at 1247-48.
206. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 2006).
207. See id.
208. Id. at 674.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Id.
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court; 2 16 the company then moved to compel arbitration because of the

arbitration agreement between the parties.217 Garrett argued that Section
4302(b) of the USERRA prevented any enforcement of such an
arbitration provision because the USERRA supersedes any conflicting
law or contract that limits the rights or benefits guaranteed by the
USERRA.218 Specifically, Garrett claimed that a "right or benefit
provided by" the USERRA includes a plaintiffs right to bring suit in
federal court.219 Circuit City filed a motion to compel arbitration, in
accordance with its Associate Issue Resolution Program.220
The district court ruled in favor of Garrett, and denied Circuit
City's motion to compel arbitration because the court found that Section
4302(b) of the USERRA and its legislative history overrode the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 2 21 As a result, Circuit City
filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit.222 In an opinion by then-Chief
Judge Edith Jones, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, and held
that USERRA claims are subject to mandatory arbitration under the
FAA.223 In order to reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit chiefly relied
on the Supreme Court's line of FAA cases and the Court's unabated proarbitration position.22 4 The court required Garrett to show that Congress
intended to foreclose the use of arbitration to resolve USERRA claims
and found a lack of explicit intent. 2 25 The court applied a strict textual
approach to determine that Congress did not intend to prohibit
arbitration because the statutory language did not expressly limit
jurisdiction to the federal district courts.22 6 The Fifth Circuit noted that
there is a difference between procedural and substantive rights; the court
explained that ensuring access to the courtroom rather than an arbitration
forum was not a substantive right arising under USERRA.227 Instead,
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 676; see also 38 U.S.C.

§ 4302(b)

(2012) (submitting that this chapter is superseding

to any state law).

219. Garrett,449 F.3d at 676.
220. Id. at 674.
221. Id. at 681. "USERRA's legislative history indicates that Congress considered a binding
arbitration agreement to be such an impediment, and that arbitration between an employer and a

USERRA-eligible employee would thus not be binding." Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 2d 717, 722 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
222. Garrett,449 F.3d at 681.
223. Id. at 673-74, 681.
224. Id. at 674; see also 9 U.S.C § 2 (2012).
225. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 674 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991)).
226. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 340 (describing the Fifth Circuit's textualist approach).
227. Id
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the Fifth Circuit determined that the arbitration agreement was a forum
selection clause because substantive rights under the USERRA can be
enforced via arbitration. 2 28 In the decision, the court pointed to the
similarities between USERRA and other employment discrimination
statutes, including Title VII (racial groups) and the ADEA (elderly).22 9
The Fifth Circuit simply dismissed the House Committee Report
addressing USERRA arbitration and noted that the report was not
precedential. 2 30 The court further explained that there is no inherent
conflict between arbitration and USERRA's underlying structure and
purposes, because arbitration can provide a fair opportunity to present
and prevail upon a claim of a USERRA violation.2 31 In reaching this
conclusion, the court focused on the differences in procedures used in
the proposed arbitration and in federal court, concluding that Garrett had
failed to show that arbitration brought pursuant to the company's rules
would not afford him. an adequate forum. 2 32 The court also dismissed
Garrett's contention that mandatory arbitration would clash with the
USERRA's underlying public policy to protect military members and
ensure national security. 233 The court found that the "enforcement of
employment arbitration agreements does not disserve or impair the
The court equated the
protections guaranteed by USERRA." 234
USERRA to statutes like the Sherman Act,235 the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,236 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 2 37 and the Securities Act of 1933,238 which are all subject to

228.
229.
230.

Garrett, 449 F.3d at 678.
Id. at 680-8 1.
Id. at 679. The court noted that there was no comparable report from the Senate, that the

House Report did not mention Gilmer, and that the courts in the cases cited in the Report prevented

intrusions into the rights of veterans by the operation of laws, contracts, or plans to which the
employee was not or could not be a party. Id. at 679, 680 n.10. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit noted

that the "snippet of legislative history" reference merely addressed the different situation of
employees covered by a labor contract. Id at 679; see also, Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d
1329, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (relying on the same Congressional report in reaching its holding that
mandatory arbitration did not preclude USERRA claims).
231. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 681 (finding no conflict because arbitrator required to apply relevant
law and because procedural safeguards existed).
232. Id. at 681, 681 n.11.
233. Id. at 681 (noting that even though USERRA protects important interests, it would be
incorrect to assume that military members' substantive rights would not be fairly and adequately
protected during arbitrations brought under the FAA).

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arbitration under Supreme Court case law.239
With its ruling, the Fifth Circuit dramatically changed the
mandatory arbitration landscape under the USERRA.2 40 Indeed, the
Garrett decision had immediate and negative ripple effects.241 Many
courts across the country justified severe limitations on USERRA rights
based almost entirely on Garrett.2 42 Significantly, the Fifth Circuit
categorically ignored the Supreme Court's well-established rule that
veterans' employment rights and accompanying statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of the veteran plaintiff. Instead of adhering
to this maxim, the Fifth Circuit focused squarely on the Supreme Court's
FAA case law.243 Consequentially, after Garrett, other federal courts
across the country generally replicated the Fifth Circuit's
methodology. 244
The next federal appellate court to address the issue of mandatory
arbitration under the USERRA was the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC.2 45 In this
case, Dr. Timothy Landis, an optometrist and member of the Indiana
National Guard, signed an employment agreement at the beginning of
239. Id. at 681. The Fifth Circuit relied on Gilmer to support this conclusion. See id. (citing
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
240. See Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
that a USERRA claim was subject to arbitration even where the underlying arbitration agreement
contained terms that violated the statute because those terms could be severed from the agreement).
241. See, e.g., Will v. Parsons Evergreene, LLC, No. 08-cv-00898, 2008 WL 5330681, at *3-4
(D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2008) (stating Congress intended to prevent arbitration involving USERRA
claims because the statute prevented the establishment of prerequisites to exercise any of the
legislation's benefits. However, the court found that the arbitration clause was not a prerequisite,
rather it operated as a waiver of a judicial forum, and there was no indication that the veteran's

rights under USERRA could not be fully realized in arbitration); Ohlfs v. Charles Schwab & Co.,
No. 08-cv-0070, 2008 WL 4426012, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2008) (concluding USERRA claims
must be arbitrated pursuant to FAA); Ernest v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 07-cv-02038, 2008 WL
2958964, at *9 (D. Colo. July 29, 2008) (adopting the reasoning in Garrett); Klein v. City of
Lansing, No. 5:06-CV-142, 2007 WL 1521187, at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2007) ("While this is a
close question, the Court sides with Garrett as to those collective bargaining agreements which
provide an elective method for arbitrating USERRA rights.");.
242. See, e.g., Will, 2008 WL 5330681, at *34 (holding that the district court in Lopez erred
because the enforcement of an arbitration agreement does not function as a "prerequisite" to the
exercise of any right under the USERRA. Instead, it serves as a waiver of a judicial forum for
resolution of the rights under USERRA, which can then be fully vindicated in arbitration. The court
heavily relied on Garrett as persuasive authority); see also Ohlfs, 2008 WL 4426012, at *4
(following the decision of the Garrettcourt in holding that the plaintiffs USERRA claims were to
be arbitrated "pursuant to the mandate of the FAA.").
243. Garrett, 449 F.3d at 674-75.
244. See, e.g., Kitts v. Menards, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ind. 2007); Will, 2008
WL 5330681, at *4; Ohlfs, 2008 WL 4426012, at *4; Ernest, 2008 WL 2958964, at *9.
245. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).
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his employment that specified that any employment dispute was subject
to mandatory and binding arbitration.24 6 Later, Landis signed a similar
agreement that contained an identical arbitration clause.247 Dr. Landis
was activated in April 2004 and he deployed to the war in Afghanistan
with his National Guard unit.2 4 8 Dr. Landis claimed that he had arranged
for his patients to be taken care of by other optometrists before he
deployed to Afghanistan.249 Landis claimed that the defendant company
did not honor the terms of the agreement upon his return and he was
demoted; he also alleged that he was threatened with termination if he
continued to serve in the military. 250 Landis subsequently filed a
USERRA suit in Kentucky federal district court, contending that he
experienced employment discrimination solely because of his
servicemember status.251 The district court ordered the matter to
arbitration and held that USERRA did not supersede the arbitration
provision contained within Landis's agreement.2 52
Landis filed an appeal of the district court's order with the Sixth
Circuit.253 The circuit court affirmed the district court's order to compel
arbitration by holding that Landis's USERRA claims were subject to
binding and mandatory arbitration because of the employment
agreement.254 The Sixth Circuit completely accepted the Fifth Circuit's
Garrett decision and reasoning, specifically determining that there was
no Congressional intent that USERRA claims were not subject to
mandatory arbitration and that there was no direct conflict between
255
USERRA's purposes and arbitration.
In a separate concurring opinion in Landis, Judge Guy Cole
admitted it was a "close case" but ultimately agreed with the majority
256
opinion.
Judge Cole explained that he wrote a separate concurrence
"only to acknowledge the odd result this holding produces and to
encourage Congress, when the issue comes up again, to be a bit more

246. Id. at 560.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 561.
251. Id.
252. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-569-R, 2007 WL 2668519 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 6, 2007) aff'd, 537 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2008).
253. Landis, 537 F.3d at 560.
254. Id. at 561.
255. See id. at 562. The Sixth Circuit also explained that the legislative history of the
USERRA does not support Congressional intent to preclude arbitration. Id.
256. Id. at 564.
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clear." 25 7 He examined the specific language of section 4302(b) of the
USERRA and noted that the words "additional prerequisites" in the list
of items that the USERRA supersedes were difficult to assess. 258 Judge
Cole determined that section 4302(b) was designed to ensure that
arbitration would not be used as a precondition to filing in federal
court.259 In his concurring opinion, Judge Cole was highly critical of the
poor wording of section 4302(b) and he noted that there was no clear
evidence in USERRA's text or the statute's legislative history that
demonstrated a clear intent to foreclose a waiver of judicial remedies. 2 60
In his concluding remarks, Judge Cole stressed that Congress should use
unambiguous language to show that it intends to preclude mandatory
arbitration because a growing number of employers are using such
arbitration provisions in employment agreements.26 1 In the recent
Ziober case, in which the Ninth Circuit joined its sister circuits in
holding that Congress did not intend to preclude compelled arbitration of
USERRA claims, Judge Paul Watford cited to Judge Cole's concurring
opinion by stating that Congress can easily amend USERRA "to make
clear that it does render pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate USERRA
claims unenforceable." 2 62
The rationale underlying both the Garrett and Landis decisions
directly clash with the pro-veterans' rights approach strongly advocated
and advanced by the Supreme Court and Congress. 2 63 The strict
textualist approach used in both Garrettand Landis severely undermines
the maxim to liberally construe veterans' employment statutes to favor
the veteran plaintiff and the decisions, in turn, were ultimately harmful
to servicemembers, the particular class that the USERRA is designed to
protect. Indeed, by focusing almost exclusively on the Supreme Court's
body of FAA case law, the Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases omitted any
discussion of the Supreme Court's established maxim calling for the
liberal construction of veterans' benefits statutes in favor of the veteran.
The Garrett and Landis decisions paved the way for lower courts to

257.

Id.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 564-65 ("Congress may not have intended members of our armed forces to submit
to binding, coercive arbitration-indeed, I think quite the opposite-but nothing in the text of the

USERRA, or its legislative history, evinces a clear intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.").

261.
262.
263.
"myopic

Id. at 565.
Zioberv. BLB Res. Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 2016).
See Hardy, supra note 3, at 348 (arguing that the Garrett and Landis courts applied a
'textualist' approach to the USERRA that was harmful to servicemembers).
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completely obfuscate the spirit of the USERRA. 2 64 For instance, in Kitts
v. Menards, Inc.,2 6 5 the court compelled arbitration and did not even
discuss the overarching legislative purpose of the USERRA.266 Instead,
the court focused almost exclusively on the FAA and the Garrett and
Landis cases as persuasive authority.267 Courts that read the USERRA
without considering its legislative intent and history, or without
consideration for the possibility of expanding upon USERRA's
protections, ignore decades of Congressional and Supreme Court
instructions to the contrary.268 Perhaps more importantly, Garrett and its
progeny have allowed other USERRA rights to be undermined. 26 9 For
instance, the USERRA specifically prohibits requiring a USERRA
plaintiff to pay fees or court costs. 2 70 However, a federal district court in
Ohio, relying on Landis, held that a mandatory arbitration agreement
requiring that an employee pay a substantial filing fee to commence
arbitration proceedings could be enforced against a USERRA
plaintiff.271 The court made no mention of, and thus evidently was
oblivious to, USERRA's ban on requiring plaintiffs to pay court costs.272
Some federal courts have rejected narrow mandatory arbitration
provisions under the USERRA. 2 73
In Baudoin v. Mid-Louisiana
Anesthesia Consultants, Inc., Bryan Baudoin, an anesthesiologist,
claimed that he was denied partnership due to his military service.274 In
2005, Baudoin "was called to active duty with the United States Army at
275
Walter Reed Army Medical Center for a ninety day tour of duty. ...
Prior to leaving for his assignment, Baudoin's boss informed him "that
the partners felt [he] wasn't carrying [his] load and [he] wasn't going to
make partner." 27 6 Baudoin filed a lawsuit against his employers, arguing
that he was denied partnership due to his status as a member of the
264. Id. at 349.
265. Kitts v. Menards, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
266. See id. at 844.
267. See id.
268. See Leyda, supra note 4, at 879-80; see also Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758,
762 (discussing the history of the USERRA and its predecessors).
269.

See Hardy, supra note 3, at 349.

270. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(1) (2012) ("No fees or court costs may be charged or taxed against
any person claiming rights under [USERRA].").
271. See Palmer v. Midland Food Servs. Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1343, 2011 WL 4458781, *1 (N.D.
Ohio 2011).
272. See id
273. See Baudoin v. Mid-Louisiana Anesthesia Consultants, Inc., 306 F. App'x 188, 192 (5th
Cir. 2009).
274. Id. at 189-91.
275. Id. at 190.
276. Id

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

29

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

396

[Vol. 34:2

United States military. 277 Baudoin's employers argued "that Baudoin's
USERRA complaint was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to
[the Garrett decision] .,,278 The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the
employers' argument by distinguishing Baudoin's arbitration provision
as much narrower than the provision in Garrett. 27 9 In so ruling, the Fifth
Circuit made it clear that broad, catchall arbitration agreements are more
likely to be enforceable.280
IV.

ARBITRATION: NOT INTENDED AND BAD PUBLIC POLICY
FOR VETERANS

Many companies, with the help of the federal courts, are subverting
Congress's original intention in passing both the USERRA and the
FAA.281 Instead of providing USERRA disputants with options for
dispute resolution, the courts and a growing number of companies have
used arbitration as a tool to evade federal courts and public scrutiny. 2 82
Thus, many veterans have essentially been forced to forgo constitutional
rights when disputes arise relating to their jobs.2 83 This part discusses
the specific reasons why arbitration should not be compelled.
There are also a number of compelling public policy arguments that
militate against mandatory arbitration under the USERRA.284 This Part,
therefore, also discusses particular public policy arguments against
binding arbitration. In contrast to arbitration, judicial adjudication
generates deterrence against future violations, educates the public,
creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values.285
More specifically, the adjudication of USERRA claims is supported by
several key arguments. The first argument is that public jury trials have
enormous social value and make the costs of war a visceral reality. The
second argument is that mandatory arbitration undermines democratic
accountability. The final argument is that mandatory arbitration widens
the civilian-military divide.

277. Id at 191.
278. Id. at 193-94.
279 See id. at 194.
280. See id.
281. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 331.
282. See Katherine V.w. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic:
Mandatory ArbitrationDeprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Dec.

7, 2015),
283.
284.
285.

http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/.
See Hardy, supra note 3, at 331, 340.
See Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 273-74.
See Moohr, supranote 115, at 401-02, 402-05.
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Why the USERRA Should Supersede Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses: How Courts Should Approach Binding Arbitration

under the USERRA
There are at least five reasons why USERRA plaintiffs should not
be compelled to enter mandatory arbitration. First, Congress and the
Supreme Court have put servicemembers in a protected classification
apart from other non-military citizens and have determined that they are
to be accorded greater rights in certain areas.2 86 By enacting the
USERRA, Congress unmistakably indicated its intention that veterans
and servicemembers must be treated differently from civilians regarding
certain types of civil obligations and employment matters.287 No persons
are entitled to the protections of the USERRA except servicemembers.2 88
The reason why there is a difference between servicemembers and
members of civilian society is clear: Regular civilian employees are not
routinely called upon to risk their lives for the company. On the other
hand, the members of the military are called upon to risk their lives for
the nation on a daily basis. This enormous distinction in potential risk is
what entitles servicemembers protected by the USERRA to a "liberal
construction" in their favor of the law that protects their right to
reemployment, protects their right to go into federal court to seek a jury
decision enforcing their rights, and protects them against anyone placing
on them "additional prerequisites to the exercise" of their rights under
the USERRA.289
The USERRA's legislative history and purpose are unique based on
the various restatements of veterans' reemployment rights statutes,
which have been enacted 'over the past seven decades, indicating that
Congress intended such rights to grow over time and respond to social
and economic developments as new issues arise. 2 90 The Supreme Court
has consistently held in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.

286.

See Terry M. Jarrett, The Servicemembers Civil ReliefAct: Important New Protectionsfor

Those in Uniform, 60 J. Mo. B. 174, 175, 179 (2004).
287. Konrad S. Lee, "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again" Will He Be Welcome at
Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 270-71 (2008).
288. See id. at 254.
289. See Fishold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946).
290. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 613 F.2d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 452 U.S. 549
(1981) ("The problem to be addressed under this statute and the nature of the remedy it was to
provide were stated in a report of the Senate Armed Forces Committee. In Senate Report No. 1477,
it said: 'Employment practices that discriminate against employees with reserve obligations have
become an increasing problem in recent years."'); see also Leyda, supra note 4, at 879 (discussing
USERRA predecessors and history).
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and its progeny that the USERRA and its predecessor statutes have been
liberally interpreted "for the benefit of those who left private life to
service their country in its hour of great need." 2 91 In a related vein, the
drafters of the USERRA certainly did not intend to subject
servicemembers to binding, coercive arbitration agreements as part of a
broad effort to ensure protections for the uniformed services, particularly
for Reserve and Guard forces.2 92 As such, the USERRA should not be
read in a vacuum, rather, it should be read with an understanding that
accounts for the goals Congress sought to accomplish by enacting the
statute.
There are certain provisions in the USERRA that make it unique
among other federal anti-discrimination statutes.293 It applies to all
employers, regardless of the number of employees; 294 the only person
who has standing to initiate an action under USERRA is the person
claiming rights or benefits under USERRA.295 In addition there are no
filing fees or court costs 29 6 and there is no statute of limitations. 29 7
While the USERRA contains an anti-discrimination provision and an
accompanying anti-retaliation provision, which are similar to provisions
in other antidiscrimination statutes, it also provides reemployment rights,
which are highly unique in the employment discrimination arena. 2 98 A
number of scholars contend that the USERRA is markedly different
from other anti-discrimination employment laws because it not only
combats discrimination against veterans but can also be considered a tax
measure.299 Put simply, by imposing reemployment and other duties on
employers, the federal government can more cheaply afford a large
military Reserve and Guard force.300 While it is true that the Supreme
Court has held that the arbitration of anti-discrimination claims such as
Title VII or ADEA claims is allowable, there is a key difference between

291.
285).
292.

See Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977) (citing Fishgold, 328 U.S. at
See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cole, J.,

concurring).

293. See Bugbee, supranote 36, at 284.
294. Cole v. Swint, 961 F.2d 58, 60 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The Act [the VRRA] does not have a
threshold business size for coverage, unlike many other acts which incorporate such limiting
provisions such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. [section] 2000e et seq.").
295. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(f) (2012).
296. Id. at §4323(h).
297. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.311 (2006).
298. See Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12.
299. See id.
300. See id.
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0
these statutes and the USERRA. 3 ' The classes of persons protected by
the ADEA (elderly) and Title VII (race, sex, religion, and national
origin) are substantially more far-reaching than USERRA plaintiffs, a
highly specific class. 302 Similarly, RICO and securities claims cited in
Garrett3 03 and LandiS304 can also be easily distinguished from USERRA
claims because USERRA is only available to qualified military members
305
whereas the other claims are generally applicable.
Second, the USERRA expressly provides that an action brought
306
Section 4323(b)(3) gives
under it should be heard in federal court.
exclusive jurisdiction of USERRA claims to the United States district
courts.30 7 Disallowing servicemembers to pursue their statutory claims
in court clearly limits the avenues in which such persons may vindicate
their rights.308 Without the option to go to court, the current reading of
the USERRA under Garrett could lead to the inequitable application of
USERRA's substantive law.309 Bypassing these laws is inequitable and
eliminates their deterrent effects. Incidentally, the fact that Gilmer
extends mandatory arbitration to claims arising under the ADEA is not
310
controlling on claims arising under the USERRA.
311
Third, the clear language in section 4302(b) precludes arbitration.
In brief, section 4302(b) prohibits agreements that make veterans worse
off. 3 12 Reading USERRA narrowly, particularly with regard to section
4302(b)'s superseding provision, permits a result clearly antithetical to

301. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 348 (discussing the difference between these statutes and the
USERRA).
302. Id. at 348-49 n.171; Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)(1), 623(a)-(c) (2012) (protecting
employees from discrimination based on age), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (2012) (protecting
employees from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), with 38
U.S.C. § 4301(a)(3) (2012) (protecting persons from discrimination based on their service in the
military).
303. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2006).
304. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2008).
305. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 349-50; see also Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, No. 3:06CV-569-R, 2007 WL 2668519, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 2007) (discussing the court's interpretation
of arbitration agreements in a securities context in Garrett).

306. See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3) ("In the case of an action against a private employer by a
person, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of the action.").
307. See id.
308.

See Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 280.

309.
310.

See id. at 280-281.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); see also

Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 281.

311. Lopez v. Dillard's, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005) ("Hence, the plain
language of 38 U.S.C. [section] 4302(b) requires that the arbitration agreement be superseded by the
USERRA.").
312. See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012); see also Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 n.2.
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Congress' goals for the statute.313 In addition, attempts to parse the
various sections of the USERRA and divide "substantive" rights from
"procedural" rights as the Garrett court did hardly amounts to the
"liberal construction" in favor of the servicemember that Fishgold and
its progeny command.3 14 If the USERRA does not preempt an
arbitration clause within an employment contract, then the words of
section 4302(b) are essentially meaningless. 315 As a consequence,
virtually all of the substantive provisions of the USERRA and all case
law interpreting it would be severely undermined.
Fourth, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial over USERRA
allegations is lost when arbitration is mandated. 6 The Seventh
Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." 1
Because USERRA plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated
damages upon a finding of willful violation of the statute, the USERRA
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Since the adoption of the USERRA, a number of federal courts have
determined that the plaintiff-veteran is entitled to a jury trial.319
Specifically, these federal courts have found that there is a right to a jury
trial because liquidated damages are legal damages as opposed to
equitable relief.320 In Duarte v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., the court
reviewed the punitive wage provisions of the USERRA and found them
to be analogous to the liquidated damages provisions available under the
ADEA that also require a finding of willfulness on the part of the

313. See Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
314. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 678-80 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see also
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
315. See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012); Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
316. See Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration,supra note 134, at 21-24
(discussing the conflict between mandatory arbitration and jury trials).
317. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
318. Maher v. City of Chicago, 463 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. 111. 2006); see also Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing
statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary course of law."); Spratt v. Guardian
Auto. Products, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D. id. 1998).
319. See, e.g., Spratt, 997 F. Supp. at 1141 (holding that a USERRA plaintiff seeking
liquidated damages was entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because the USERRA
provided for liquidated damages).
320. Id.; see also Maher, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 838-39, 843 (holding that the reservist was entitled
to jury trial under USERRA to determine whether municipality's alleged violation of Act was
willful).
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defendant. 32 1 The court in Duarte concluded, "[i]n reaching this
conclusion, I am mindful that 'maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history
and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
32 2
Further, the legislative
should be scrutinized with the utmost care."'
to a jury trial as a
right
the
treat
to
intent
clear
Congress'
evinces
history
32 3
arbitration.
of
right not subject to waiver in favor
Fifth, mandatory arbitration constitutes an impermissible
prerequisite. A requirement that USERRA plaintiffs submit their claim
to an arbitrator for binding arbitration cannot be reasonably viewed as
anything other than the establishment "of additional prerequisites to the
exercise" of a sevivcemember's full range of rights under the
USERRA.3 2 4 By "additional prerequisites," Congress clearly meant to
stop employers from requiring "additional resort to mechanisms such as
grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative
appeals .... 325 Importantly, "there is no obvious non-USERRA
context in which courts speak of the invalidation of 'additional
prerequisites to the exercise' of a right." 32 6 In Lopez, the court held that
the USERRA plaintiffs arbitration agreement provided an
impermissible prerequisite because it mandated that before exercising
her rights under the USERRA and obtaining the relief to which she is
entitled thereunder, as the plaintiff she must participate in an arbitration
proceeding.32 7
B. Public Policy Concerns
There are a number of important public policy factors that strongly
weigh against mandatory arbitration.328 Arbitration is not an effective
forum in which to satisfy the public policy goals of the USERRA, even
329
In Gilmer, the
when servicemembers are accorded a fair hearing.
321. Duarte v. Agilent Tech. Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (D. Colo. 2005).
322. Id. at 1038 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
323. Maher, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830)
("When, therefore, we find that the amendment requires that the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved in suits at common law, the natural conclusion is, that this distinction was present to the
minds of the framers of the amendment.").

324.
1248 (D.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012); see also Lopez v. Dillard's Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245,
Kan. 2005).
See H.R. REP. No. 103-65, at 20 (1993), as reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453.
Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12.
See Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
See Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 280.
See id. at 273-74.
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Supreme Court stressed that a key consideration in evaluating whether
arbitration can be enforced is whether a "prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum . . . ."330

The litigation of USERRA claims is paramount to the statute's
purpose. 331 Professor Geraldine Moohr argues that the litigation of
employment discrimination claims creates several important
enforcement mechanisms that are crucial to eliminating workplace
discrimination: (1) "judicial decisions ... provide general deterrence of
future violations" because such decisions speak with the authority of the
state; (2) "the courts develop and refine the law of employment
discrimination, establishing precedents, and define a uniform standard";
and (3) "the judicial process educates the community and forms public
values, when a law seeks to change public sentiment." 3 32
The private nature of arbitration is bad public policy. 3 33 In contrast
to litigation's public nature, arbitration is characterized as a private
proceeding. 334 "Papers filed with arbitrators are not part of any public
record; proceedings take place in private offices rather than in public
courtrooms; and they tend to be less interesting to the media." 3 35 The
arbitration proceedings, shrouded in well-known secrecy, prevent
American voters, citizens, and residents from knowing what employers
are doing to veteran-employees.336 The secret arbitrations also prevent
Americans from knowing that the government is failing veterans training
for a deployment, currently deployed, or returning from the
battlefield.3 37 Likewise, mandatory arbitrations conceal the fact that
Congress is not successfully reaching its goals set out in the
USERRA.338
There is inherent social value in ensuring that USERRA cases are
heard in a federal court that is open to the public. 33 9 Deterrence of future
USERRA violations requires public knowledge of the disputes as well as

330. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); see also Garrett v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting whether it "is not inconsistent
with the important social policies being addressed by federal statutes.")
331. See Moohr, supra note 115, at 400.
332. Id.
333. See id.
334. Id. at 402.
335.

Schwartz, EnforcingSmall Printto ProtectBig Business, supranote 141, at 61.

336.
337.
338.
339.

See
See
See
See

Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 276.
id.
Moohr, supranote 115, at 399.
id. at 400.
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their final disposition.3 40 "The public forum of litigation makes this
information available to the parties, to entities similar to the parties, and
to the general public." 3 4 1 Thus, litigation of workplace discrimination
claims furthers the public policy goals of the USERRA by generally
2
To the veterandeterring and educating prospective violators. 34
employee, adverse employment decisions based on their military service
are undoubtedly a cost of war.3 43 As such, the trials showcase the
realities and costs of war and thus should be made public. The trials
convey the power and emotion to affect public opinion about war and,
by extension, to influence the outcome of elections. 3 " By ensuring that
the hearings are secret and far removed from public scrutiny, mandatory
3 45
The chief
arbitrations ultimately widen the civilian-military divide.
reason for this divide is that the public becomes increasingly ignorant of
the costs of war as the employers purge veteran employees during
346
wartime.
The media could serve as an important public relations tool for
veteran employees. Media coverage of USERRA trials allows the public
to have a visceral sense of what is happening when veterans deploy to
distant battlefields and then experience adverse action at work upon their
347
return, resulting in consequential effects on families and the troops.
This media coverage allows the public what many veterans and their
families experience on a routine basis as a result of their military
obligations. 3 4 8 By denying this opportunity, the civilian-military divide
340. See id. at 431.
341. Id.
342. See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE No. 915.002, supra note 32. The
EEOC contends that damages and other relief is an important part of the pubic record that not only
compensates victims of discrimination but also informs the broader community of the costs of

discrimination. Id. Additionally, the EEOC argues that "by issuing public decisions and orders, the
courts also provide notice of the identity of violators of the law and their conduct." Id. In effect,

"the risks of negative publicity and blemished business reputation can be powerful influences on
behavior." Id.
343. See Belluck, supra note 104.
344.
345.

See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, supra note 32.
See Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 276.

346. See Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assoc. Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Remarks Delivered
at a Servicemembers Town Hall at Fort Stuart (Sept. 1, 2015).
347. See, e.g., Belluck, supra note 104 (providing an example of an USERRA discrimination
case covered by the media); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 49, 51-52 (2006) (arguing that the media plays a key role in reporting war-related news to the
general public); Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of War:
When Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity ofAuthenticity, 25

NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 87, 105-07 (2011) (arguing that the media serves as a
check on Congressional and executive wartime actions).

348. Belluck, supranote 104.
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349

A corollary to the civilian-military divide is that the mandatory
arbitrations simultaneously widen the divide between the military and
the judiciary. 5 o Unfortunately, an enormous divide exists between the
courts and the USERRA's purpose.3 51 Judge Richard Posner has noted
that the primary purpose of the USERRA is simply to "encourage people
to join the reserves."3 52 Judge Posner explained, "[t]here is little
evidence that employers harbor a negative stereotype about military
service or that Congress believes they do." 5 The Fifth Circuit quoted
this reasoning in its holding that the USERRA did not provide a cause of
action for harassment based on a person's military status.354 The Fifth
Circuit explained, "we find nothing to indicate that Congress passed
USERRA to combat this type of [harassment] discrimination against
military members."355 However, a compelling question arises. Why
would Congress bother passing a statute specifically to protect
servicemembers from employment discrimination at all, if no such
problem actually exists? Further, the Fifth Circuit shows a profound
ignorance of the modem problems faced by veterans in the workplace.356
Congress and President Obama clearly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit
decision and quickly amended the USERRA to ensure that a cause of
action for harassment under the USERRA was unequivocal.
Nevertheless, these examples demonstrate the exact reason that
USERRA claims need to be heard in federal courts rather than confined
to arbitration.
Mandatory arbitration also deters military recruitment and retention
efforts. President George Washington once remarked, "[t]he willingness
with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no matter
349. See Bradford J. Kelley, Photos of the Fallen and the Dover Ban: An Analysis of the Media
from PhotographingMilitary Coffins, 26 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 116 (2016).
350. See Bettenhausen, supra note 33, at 276.
351. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, J.), vacated in part, 165 F. 3d 593
(7th Cir. 2009).
352. Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 392.
353. Id.
354. Carder v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 179 (5th Cir. 2011).
355. Id.
356. See id.
357. See H.R. REP. No. 112-242, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2011) ([C]larifying the definition of
"'benefit,' 'benefit of employment,' or 'rights and benefits' to include the right not to suffer
workplace harassment or the creation of a hostile work environment [by including] the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment ... to conform the USERRA with the Supreme Court's
decision in Meritor Savings Bank vs. Vinson, and the DOL's request for such change in its annual
report on the USERRA.").
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how justified, shall be directly proportional as to how they perceive the
veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their
The USERRA is designed not only to prevent
country." 5
discrimination, but also to protect a federal interest in military
recruitment. 35 9 "The decision to enlist [or continue one's service] in
America's military is not made in a patriotic vacuum." 360 Instead,
potential recruits and current members will invariably contemplate the
cost-benefit analysis of the benefits of service against the costs; this
evaluation includes the cost of forgone opportunity for advancement in
civilian employment.3 61 Many individuals would decline or terminate
their military service in the absence of the USERRA's protections due to
the fear of losing their civilian job, or being inhibited from gaining
This is especially troubling considering that the
civilian employment.
post-Cold War military policy has placed an increased burden on the
The recruitment challenge is
National Guard and Reservists.363
comparably worrisome because the protracted conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan have put prospective recruits on notice that enlistment will
likely lead to combat deployment, involving serious risks of injury or
death. 3 64 Further, military recruiters have struggled in recent years to
meet their target recruitment quotas despite relaxed standards and
providing unusual incentives for enlistment.365
Retention is also negatively impacted. The fear of losing their jobs
along with the other costs of deployment has already caused a
substantial number of Reserve and Guard forces to leave the military

358.

Jonathan T. Williams, Veteran's First? VA Should Give Vet Contracting Program

Priority,47 WTR PROCUREMENT LAw. 1 (2012).

359. See Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12.
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also Forte, supra note 101, at 289-90 (discussing the federal interest in military
recruitment).
362. See Bugbee, supra note 36, at 282-83.
363. See Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12; see also Forte,supra note 101, at 293-94.
364. See Suskin & Wimmer, supra note 12.
365. Id. The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have already had a deleterious impact on
the military recruitment and retention efforts for several years. See, e.g., Peter Spiegel, Army Misses
Recruiting Target by 7%, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2007, at A13 (describing recruitment and retention
challenges); see also Michael Kilian, Army Study: US. Facing Hard Choices, CHI. TRIB., July 12,
2005, at C9 (discussing an Army report that detailed the strain that the concurrent wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan placed on the military). In order to bolster recruitment and retention, the military has
offered usual financial incentives. See Josh White, Many Take Army's "Quick Ship "Bonus, WASH.
POST, Aug. 27, 2007, at A01 (describing the Army's offer of a $20,000 bonus to recruits willing to
leave for basic training within a month); see also Ann Scott Tyson, Army Guard Refilling Its Ranks,

WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at A01 (discussing a $2,000 bonus offered to Guard members for
enlisting new members).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

39

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
406

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:2

once they return from combat.3 66 As a result of modem military policy,
inadequately enforced protections can serve as a breaking point for
Reservists faced with the multi-pronged challenge of having to balance a
possible deployment, maintain or find a civilian career, as well as
address family and personal matters.367 Modem warfare increasingly
relies on sophisticated technological operations and intelligence
gathering; this means that the modern soldiers are increasingly "whitecollar." 36 8 If these soldiers leave the military, there will be a significant
void with their absence.3 69 Consider the occupations of some of the
USERRA mandatory arbitration plaintiffs: an optometrist (Landis);370 an
anesthesiologist (Baudion);371 and a technological specialist (Garrett).3 72
Importantly, there is a serious concern that apathy regarding the
difficulties of returning military members will continue to grow and that
many civilians considering joining the military will be deterred from
such a decision.3 73 Likewise, there is a fear that morale and national
security will be noticeably damaged because of the plight of these
returning servicemembers.37 4 USERRA and its predecessor laws were
specifically designed to improve morale of servicemembers.3 75 The
importance of creating an overall climate that encourages service (both
recruitment and retention) in the National Guard and Reserves is critical
since these forces operate in a very tough environment in which the
operational tempo oftentimes involves a combat deployment or
preparation for one.376
There are other practical problems with mandatory arbitration under
the USERRA. Most notably, many USERRA complaints are resolved

366.

See Lee, supra note 287 at 250.

367.
368.

See id. at 249.
Id. at 250-51.

369.

See, e.g., Tom Bowman, Army Is EnlistingMore Low-Scoring Recruits, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.

16, 2005, at A23 (discussing the lower quality recruits targeted by the Army); Damien Cave, Vital
Military Jobs Go Unfulfilled, Study Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2005, at A4 (noting that the
military's successful general recruitment effort masked large shortfalls in critical combat specialist
positions).
370. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, No: 3:06-CV-569-R, 2007 WL 2668519, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 6, 2007).
371. See Baudoin v. Mid-Louisiana Anesthesia Consultants, Inc., 306 F. App'x 188, 189 (5th
Cir. 2009).
372. See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
373. Lee, supra 287, at 277.
374. Id.
375. See Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003)
(noting that USERRA and its predecessor statutes were intended to "bolster the morale of those
serving their country").
376. See Lee, supra 287, at 276.
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by the DOL, which conducts investigations and seeks voluntary
employer compliance.377 If DOL efforts are not successful, the cases are
then referred to the Department of Justice.378 This triggers a dilemma
for these departments: will either department be willing to represent
USERRA claimants in informal hearings before privately appointed
arbitrators? 379 It seems highly unlikely that either department would
want to get involved in such proceedings.38 0 In addition to compelling
legal reasons, the policy and practical consequences reflect important
reasons why servicemembers should not be compelled to mandatory
arbitration.
V.

STRENGTHENING THE

USERRA: SOME SUGGESTIONS

There are several recommendations that may help the situation.
The first and most obvious solution to mandatory arbitration under the
USERRA is a legislative solution to amend the USERRA. Another
possible solution is requiring companies that require pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration to publicly report the outcomes of such
arbitrations and claims to ensure a highly level of transparency. State
action should also be considered. This part offers some positive steps to
improve the situation.
A. CongressionalSolution? Congress Should Enact a Bill Similar to
the SAJA
In order to resolve the inherent conflict between the FAA and the
USERRA, U.S. Senator Robert Casey, Jr., a Democrat from
Pennsylvania, introduced the Service Members Access to Justice Act
("SAJA") in the U.S. Senate in 2008."' The SAJA legislation explicitly
provides that any USERRA claims supersede arbitration clauses
contained in any employment agreements.38 2 Most importantly, the
SAJA would provide USERRA plaintiffs with full access to federal
377.

Samuel F. Wright, Law Review 0619 Mandatory Arbitration Mandate: Court Ruling Sets

Back

USERRA

Enforcement,

https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.roa.org/resource/resmgr/LawReviews/2006/0619-LR.pdf

ROA,
(last

visited Apr. 29, 2017).
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See Servicemembers Access to Justice Act, S. 3432, 110th Cong. (2008); see also Hardy,
supranote 3, at 348.

382. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 344.
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courts to resolve employment discrimination claims.383 Interestingly,
one of the co-sponsors of the proposed SAJA bill was then-Senator
Barack Obama, a Democrat from Illinois. 3 84 As a strong supporter of the
SAJA legislation, then-Senator Obama unequivocally stated that
servicemembers coming back from war "should not have to fight another
battle at home for the benefits and rights they deserve." 385
The SAJA bill sought to overturn the Garrett case and the cases

that followed the Fifth Circuit's decision.386

The SAJA of 2008

specifically contained a section that expressly stated that agreements to
arbitrate disputes stemming from USERRA violations would not be
enforceable.387 Furthermore, the SAJA bill reinforced this point by
adding a section to the USERRA that explicitly states that any
agreement or provision between a USERRA employee and employer
requiring disputes to be resolved by arbitration would not be
enforceable.388 However, exceptions to the enforceability of agreements
to arbitrate are allowed in the event that both employer and employee
agree to submit any USERRA claim to arbitration, but only after the
38
dispute arises.389 In other words, the parties cannot preemptively agree
to arbitrate before a USERRA dispute arises.
The SAJA of 2008 provided enhanced protection for
servicemembers in other ways as well. 3 90 First, the SAJA bill allowed
USERRA plaintiffs the ability to file claims in either federal or state
court against certain state government employers.39 1 Second, the SAJA
bill provided USERRA plaintiffs with greater remedies such as
liquidated and punitive damages.392 Third, the legislation allowed for

383.

See id.

384.

Id. at 343; see also Samuel F. Wright, Law Review 1077 Enhancing the Protections of

USERRA:

Progress

Made,

and

What

Remains

To

Be

Accomplished,

http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.roa.org/resource/resmgr/LawReviews/2010/10077-LR.pdf

ROA,
(last

visited Apr. 29, 2017).
385.

Casey, Kennedy, Obama Introduce Bill to Help Servicemembers and Veterans Keep Their

Jobs,
BOB
CASEY:
U.S.
SEN.
FOR
PA.
(Aug.
1,
2008),
http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=4a64c2cO-3750-4d1c-b60882b68bcc8da9 [hereinafter BOB CASEY].
386. Hardy, supra note 3, at 343.
387. Hardy, supra note 3, at 343-44. ("Specifically, [section] 3 of the SAJA is entitled
'Unenforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes Arising under USERRA.").
388. Id.
389. See id. at 344. The agreement between the parties must be made "knowingly and
voluntarily." Id.
390. See id.
391. Seeid
392. See id
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successful USERRA plaintiffs to get mandatory attorney's fees.3 93
Fourth, the SAJA bill makes it easier for employers to reemploy
returning servicemembers upon their return from combat and streamlines
injunctive relief to prevent terminations from occurring.3 9 4 Another
notable benefit of the SAJA of 2008 is that the legislation clarifies that
the USERRA does not have a statute of limitations. 3 95 Finally, SAJA
forbids wage discrimination against veterans.39 6 On September 27,
2008, the SAJA bill was introduced to Congress.39 7 Both SAJA of 2008
Senate and House bills died in committee.
In 2012, two separate bills were introduced that would render
arbitration clauses invalid in USERRA cases and guarantee military
members the right to have their cases heard in federal court: the
Servicemember Employment Protection Act of 2012399 and the SAJA of
2012.400 The two bills were essentially carbon copies of the SAJA of
2008.401 Again, both bills stalled in committee.402 A likely chief reason
for Congressional inaction on this issue is that pro-arbitration
Republicans are generally categorically opposed to any efforts that could
possibly chip away at the nation's ardent pro-arbitration position.40 3
Despite Congressional inaction, there is still some optimism based
on recent veterans protection improvements. Congress amended the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) 404 and the Injunctive Relief

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
See H.R. 7178, 110th Cong. (2008).

398.

See S. 3432 (110'h): Servicemembers Access to Justice Act of 2008, GOVTRACK,

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s3432 (last visited Apr. 23, 2017) (explaining that the
SAJA bill died in Congress and was not enacted).
399. SeeS. 3236, 112th Cong. (2011).
400. See S. 3233, 112th Cong. (2011).
401. Compare S. 3236, 112th Cong. (2011), and S. 3233, 112th Cong. (2011) with H.R. 7178,
110th Cong. (2008).
402. See All Bill Information (Except Text) for S.3236 - Servicemember Employment
Protection Act of 2012, 112th Cong., CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-

congress/senate-bilI/3236/all-info
Employment

Protection

(Apr. 29, 2017); see also S. 3236 (112th): Servicemember
Act

of

2012,

112'h

GovTRACK

Cong.,

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 12/s3236 (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
403.

See

2008

Republican

Platform,

AM.

PREStDENCY

PROJECT

1,

28

(2008),

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulpaperspdf/78545.pdf (criticizing Democrats and trial lawyers that
seek to "weaken lower-cost dispute resolution alternatives such as mediation and arbitration in order
to put more cases into court.").
404. See SCRA-Legislative History of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, SCRA,
https://www.servicememberscivilreliefact.com/blog/scra-legislative-history/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2017).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

43

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

410

[Vol. 34:2

for Veterans Act of 2008.0 In 2011, Congress enacted the Vow to Hire
Heroes Act of 2011,406 which amended the USERRA to include hostile
work environment as a cause of action under the statute.407 The
Improving SCRA, the USERRA Protections Act of 2008, and the Vow
to Hire Heroes Act evince a desire and willingness on the part of some
members in Congress to further the protections of the USERRA.408 In a
similar vein, there is a willingness by some states to further limit
mandatory arbitration in other related areas.409 Congress has tried to be
responsive to these outcries for limitation on arbitration; in 2009,
Senator Al Franken introduced an amendment to the 2010 Department of
Defense ("DoD") appropriations bill prohibiting the use of appropriated
funds for DoD contractors that require employees to resolve certain
claims in arbitration. 4 10 Former President Obama signed the amendment
into law on December 19, 2009.411 Furthermore, President Obama was a
co-sponsor of the SAJA bill,412 which certainly demonstrates executive
willingness.
Ultimately, a legislative amendment would be the best way to

405. See H.R. 6225, 110th Cong. § 1 (2009); see also H.R. 6225 - Improving SCRA and
USERRA

Protections

Act

of

2008,

I1y

Cong.,

CONGRESS.GOV,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/6225 (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
406. Veterans' Opportunity to Work to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (2011)
(enacted).
407. See Wang v. New York State Dept. of Health, 966 N.Y.S.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2013) (holding that a hostile work environment claim is cognizable under USERRA).
408. See
SCRA:
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
Overview,
MILITARY.COM,
http://www.military.com/benefits/military-legal-matters/scra/servicemembers-civil-relief-act-

overview.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2017) (explaining the wide range of protections for those
entering service, in active duty, or deployed); see H.R. 6225 (110'4): Improving SCRA and USERRA
Protections

Act

of

2008,

GOVTRACK.COM,

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 10/hr6225/summary (last visited
Apr.
23,
2017)
(describing how the USERRA Protections Act of 2008 authorizes the court to fully vindicate a
veteran's employment or reemployment under USERRA); see H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (2011)
(enacted) (stating the improvements to the transition assistance program and improving the
transition of veterans to civilian employment).
409. See Margot Roosevelt, Navy Reservist Wants a Day in Court, Not Arbitration, THE
ORANGE
COUNTY
REGISTER
(June
5,
2015),

http://cqrcengage.com/navyleague/app/document/14129898;jsessionid=1
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address the application problem because courts have varied so much in
their interpretations of mandatory arbitration under the USERRA.413 A
legislative amendment would be a way for Congress to implement a
uniform rule across the board, thus making a strongly pro-veteran
statement during a time of war.
B. Tax Relief and Incentivesfor Employers
Another Congressional solution to consider is to provide employers
with some sort of business tax credit for losses or expenses directly
caused by servicemembers' military obligations and reemployment.4 14
This solution would allow employers to mitigate their losses by
providing tax relief, thereby providing employers with some economic
incentive and generating goodwill among employers to willingly comply
with the USERRA.415 Compared to the specific USERRA amendment
solution discussed earlier, this solution would certainly be more
palatable to ardent pro-arbitration Republicans.
C

Required DataReporting

Another solution which could create needed transparency would be
that Congress can require companies that have mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration to report annually and provide public data concerning
USERRA arbitration claims and outcomes. 416
Data regarding
arbitrations and outcomes can be specifically provided to the DOL, the
agency responsible for employment issues. 417 There is great value in
making the data publicly available so that federal agencies such as the
EEOC and watchdogs can monitor patterns of employment
discrimination against veterans.4 18 Certainly veterans' advocacy groups
would be interested in this information as well. Equally importantly,
publicly available information may dissuade veterans from seeking
employment with a particular employer if the veteran is aware that a
significant number of arbitration claims have been filed against a
413. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 342.
414.

See Forte, supranote 101, at 341.

415. Id. at 291 ("Without such initiatives, the protections of USERRA may be inadequate to
address the needs of the military member, the burdens of the civilian employer, and the realities of
the modem labor market.").
416. Ramona L. Lampley, "Underdog" Arbitration:A Planfor Transparency, 90 WASH. L.

REv. 1727, 1775 (2015).
417. Id. (noting that the DOL is responsible for employment issues).
418. See id. at 1775-76.
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particular company, regardless of any particular arbitral outcome.4 19
D. State Action
Another course of action to consider is for individual states to pass
their own additional and supplemental laws to provide further protection
for veterans. The USERRA sets the minimum for protections for
military members and preempts state laws that offer less.420
Accordingly, the USERRA does not preclude states or employers from
granting greater protections or rights. 421 Most states already have some
measures in place that are markedly similar to the USERRA but they
422
vary considerably from state to state.
State laws may prove to be especially important for National Guard
members who regularly deploy to combat and also take part in state
emergencies, disaster relief, and law enforcement missions. 4 23 However,
state action is likely limited in specifically addressing the problem of
mandatory arbitrations since state efforts to prevent mandatory
arbitration would likely violate the FAA. 424 Nevertheless, any federal
solutions must account for corresponding state action.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Afghanistan is expected to continue for some time
and President Donald Trump's foreign and military policies remain
uncertain. Even though military operations have theoretically ended in
Iraq, U.S. soldiers are still deployed there and hundreds of advisors have
been sent to Iraq to combat the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
("ISIS").425

This vexing background combined with the poor economic

419. See id at 1776 (comparing veterans to consumers who may be dissuaded from purchasing
a product that they see hundreds of arbitration claims have been filed against).
420. See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(a)-(b) (2012) (explaining that USERRA supersedes all state law and
that nothing may nullify or diminish the current standards).
421.

Other Workplace Standards:Reemployment and NondiscriminationRights for Uniformed

Service Members, U.S. DEP'T LAB., https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/userra.htm (last updated Dec.
2016).
422. See John F. Beasley, Jr. & Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Reemployment Rightsfor Noncareer
Members of the Uniformed Services: Federaland State Law Protections, 20 LAB. LAW. 155, 169

(2004) (discussing various state USERRA laws).
423. See Guard FAQS, NAT'L GUARD, https://www.nationalguard.com/guard-faqs#faq-5381
(last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
424. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012)
(holding that state supreme courts must adhere to a correct interpretation of the FAA).
425. Thomas C. Terry, Of Foreign Fevers, Shot, and Shell: Constitutional Rights of Media
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times will surely continue to encumber servicemembers and employers
alike. As such, the number of USERRA actions is not likely to abate.
Congressional legislation presents the most promising solution.
Action by Congress specifically and unequivocally stating that
employment agreements for disputes arising under the USERRA are not
subject to mandatory and binding arbitration can settle this issue once
and for all. Significantly, a specific Congressional amendment changing
the language of the USERRA could remove any uncertainty for courts to
apply USERRA in a way that puts servicemembers at a disadvantage.42 6
Additionally, Congress could require companies that have mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration report annually and provide public data
concerning USERRA arbitration claims and outcomes in order to
provide greater transparency. State action should also be seriously
considered whereby states pass their own additional and supplemental
laws to provide enhanced protection for veterans.
This Article has argued that veteran employees should not be
compelled to enter mandatory arbitration. The courts, not arbitrators,
should hear employment discrimination claims under the USERRA. As
the old adage "everyone deserves their day in court" goes, this is
particularly true for combat veterans deploying to and returning from
war.

Access to the BattlefieldAfter Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 5 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT
L. REv. 95, 98 (2015).
426. See Hardy, supra note 3, at 342 (explaining that there is a lack of consensus among
district courts regarding the text of USERRA).
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